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INTRODUCTION

In 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit handed down a
decision, In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation, upholding the practice
of judicial claim limitation as non-violative of the due process rights of a
patentee.1 There, the plaintiff, or patentee, asserted 1,975 claims for 31 patents. 2
The district judge presiding over the case arbitrarily limited the patentee to 64
claims, with the provision that additional claims could be brought if they raised
issues of infringement or validity not duplicative of the claims already brought. 3
The provision allowing additional claims was a constitutional safety valve,
designed to mitigate the potential of the claim limitation practices to trample on
a patentee’s due process rights. On appeal, the patentee in In re Katz made this
exact argument—that claim limitation is a government-sanctioned deprivation
of property rights that are irrationally protected under the Constitution without
the requisite process.4
The In re Katz decision has been questioned in its conformity with a patentee’s
due process rights, especially as the standard is applied in district courts
throughout the country. In addition, after a judgment on the merits of an
infringement claim, federal courts refuse to allow patentees to assert any
nonrepresentative claims that were limited at the outset of the original litigation
as precluded by the doctrine of res judicata.
This Note will first establish the principles of due process upon which the
patentees’ arguments about due process violations are founded. Additionally,
the Note explains the rise of complex patent litigation and the dilemma that
district court judges face in presiding over such voluminous and complex cases.
This Note will argue that due process is not necessarily the most effective
framework under which to criticize the In re Katz safety valve standard. The more
convincing argument is the safety valve’s contention with the provisions of the
U.S. Patent Act. Even if due process is not the best vehicle for criticizing the
safety valve standard, this Note will nonetheless perform a full procedural due
process analysis. Additionally, this Note will acknowledge that the real due
process violation likely occurs at the stage of refusal, based on principles of res
judicata, to allow a patentee to bring claims that were classified in preceding
litigation as nonrepresentative, thus not individually litigated.
Finally, this Note provides potential solutions that balance the interests of a
district judge in conducting their matters in a just and speedy manner and the
property interest that a patentee has in his or her patent claims. The solution will
include a call for Congress to act in directives to limit the power of the United
1
2
3
4

639 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1308.
Id. at 1309.
Id. at 1310.
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States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to issue patents that become
problematic in litigation, amend the U.S. Patent Act, or revise the current
treatment of patent rights as on parity with real or personal property.
II. BACKGROUND
A. IN RE KATZ

The final decision of In re Katz by the Federal Circuit was the conclusion of a
highly complex patent case on appeal from the United States District Court for
the Central District of California.5 The plaintiff, Ronald A. Katz Technology
Licensing LP (“Katz”), owned several patents on interactive call-processing
systems and call-conferencing systems.6 “Between 2005 and 2006, Katz filed 25
separate actions in the federal district courts in the Eastern District of Texas and
the District of Delaware.”7 All those cases were transferred to the Central
District of California for pretrial proceeding before Judge R. Gary Klausner, who
presided over a previous case involving Katz and the asserted patents. 8 In total,
Katz asserted 1,975 claims from thirty-one patents.9
At the outset of the proceedings, several defendants asked the court to limit
the number of claims asserted in the action.10 Katz responded with a proposed
assertion of fifty claims per defendant group, which could then be narrowed to
twenty after discovery.11 The court mandated that only a total of sixty-four
claims could be brought.12 This mandate opened a safety valve by allowing
additional claims if a patentee raised issues of infringement or validity that were
not duplicative of the claims already brought.13
In response to the court’s mandate, Katz moved to sever and stay the nonselected claims.14 The motion was denied by the court.15 The appeal at the
Federal Circuit was largely a result of the district court’s refusal to sever and stay
Katz’s non-selected claims.16 Katz claimed that, by entering final judgment
without severing and staying Katz’s non-selected claim, the district court

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Id. at 1308.
Id.
Id. at 1309.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1309–10.
Id.
Id. at 1309–1310.
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destroyed Katz’s right to its unselected claims without due process.17 The
Federal Circuit rejected Katz’s due process arguments, holding that the trial court
properly imposed a burden on Katz to show that any of the unselected claims
raised issues of infringement or validity that were not duplicative of the selected
claims.18 The Federal Circuit found that since Katz was in the best position to
narrow the dispute, “allocating the production burden to the claimant will benefit
the decision-making process and therefore will not offend due process . . . .”19
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit announced that the district court’s due process
analysis was valid “[b]ased on its initial determination that the asserted patents
contained many duplicative claims.”20
The Federal Circuit left open the possibility that a trial court’s claim selection
decisions in such a case are reviewable.21 However, such a review is appropriate
only if the moving party could demonstrate that some of its “unselected claims
presented unique issues as to liability or damages” related to the accused
infringement claims or defenses to invalidity.22 The Federal Circuit reaffirmed
its rule in Stamps.com Inc. v. Endicia, Inc., upholding the lower court’s refusal to
allow additional claims beyond those litigated, because the patentee “did not file
a motion to add claims with the requisite showing of need.”23 In Stamps.com, the
plaintiff “conceded the court’s authority to impose a limit on the number of
claims,” but they still asserted due process violations for refusal to bring those
claims that were not litigated.24 The Federal Circuit focused heavily on the
plaintiff’s lack of attempt to “make a good cause showing” in its application of
the In re Katz standard.25
B. IN RE KATZ IN DISTRICT COURTS

Since the Federal Circuit handed down its decision in In re Katz in 2011,
several district courts have applied its articulated standard.26 Notably, in Masimo
Corp. v. Philips Electronics North America Corp., the court applied the In re Katz
standard to litigation between two entities where the plaintiff asserted seventeen

Id. at 1310.
Id. at 1311.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 1312.
21 Id. at 1312-13.
22 Id. at 1312.
23 437 Fed. App’x 897, 902 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
24 Id. at 902.
25 Id. at 902-03.
26 Elizabeth Rader, Preserving Due Process in Approaches to Narrowing Claims in Multi-Patent
Lawsuits,
IP
WATCH
DOG
(Sept.
8,
2019),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/09/08/preserving-due-process-in-approaches-tonarrowing-claims-in-multi-patent-lawsuits/id=113031/.
17
18
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independent claims with seventy-eight related dependent claims, all of which
represented innovative features.27 In limiting the representative claims to thirty,
the Federal District Court for the District of Delaware alluded to the In re Katz
court’s finding that early reduction was permissible based on the “common
genealogy of Katz’s patents.”28 Additionally, like In re Katz, the court purported
to leave open the possibility that additional claims could be added with a good
cause showing.29 No application of the In re Katz safety valve standard has
yielded a result where the court found a good cause showing.
C. DUE PROCESS

So, why was Katz calling foul based on due process principles? The short
answer is that intellectual property rights are just what they say they are –
property rights.30 Consequently, due process is the constitutional clause that
seeks to ensure that those property rights are not wrongfully taken from their
holder without the proper procedure.31 The Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”32 The Fourteenth
Amendment also guarantees that “[n]o State [shall] . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”33 In defining what due process
requires, the Supreme Court announced in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co. that, at a minimum, “deprivation of life, liberty, or property by
adjudication be proceeded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to
the nature of the case.”34 The Mullane minimum standard for due process can
be separated into two elements: notice of the charge or issue, and the opportunity
for a meaningful hearing.35 Due process has been divided into two categories
over time – procedural and substantive due process.36 In short, procedural due
process requires the government to follow the necessary procedures before
27
28

n.7)).

918 F. Supp. 2d 277 (D. Del. 2013).
Id. at 283 (quoting In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Pat. Litig., 639 F.3d at 1312

Rader, supra note 26 (citing Masimo, 918 F. Supp. 2d at 286 (D. Del. 2013)).
Intellectual
Property,
CORNELL
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/intellectual_property (last visited Nov. 13, 2020) (“The law
of intellectual property can be seen as analogous to the law of tangible property in that both
consist of a bundle of rights conferred upon the property owner.”).
31 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
32 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
33 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
34 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
35 See id. (stating that when a proceeding is one in which property rights may be deprived,
“notice and hearing must measure up to the standards of due process.”).
36 Procedural
Due
Process,
CORNELL
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/procedural_due_process (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
29
30
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taking life, liberty, or property and prohibits “arbitrary and unfair deprivations”
of the same “without procedural safeguards.”37 Claim limiting is inherently
procedural since it relates to how the business of the court is conducted.38 The
specific procedural process due in any case is decided by balancing several
factors.39 These include the private interest affected; the risk of erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and the probable value
of additional or substitute safeguards; and finally, the government interest,
including function involved, and fiscal and administrative burdens of additional
procedure.40 As previously mentioned, on appeal, the Federal Circuit found that
the trial judge did not violate Katz’s due process rights when he limited the
number of claims to 64.41 The Federal Circuit cited the safety valve standard as
the mitigating factor that prevented any due process violations. 42 Under such a
standard, Katz could assert additional claims for adjudication as long as he could
show that the new claims raised non-duplicative issues of validity or
infringement.43
D. PATENTS AS PROPERTY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

An important protection guaranteed by due process is access to the courts,
and whether the safety valve provides a patentee access to the courts to vindicate
his or her rights consistent with due process is questionable.44 The Fourteenth
Amendment and Fifth Amendment “require that the courts shall be open to
every person with a right to a remedy for injury to . . . property . . . .”45 Since
due process guarantees access to the courts to remedy an injury to property, a
necessary question is whether courts treat a patent as a property right that is
afforded the same due process protections contemplated by the Fifth
Amendment. It is fundamentally true that a patent-derived right is a property
right that is on equal footing with rights associated with ownership of land or
Howard v. Grinage, 82 F.3d 1343, 1350 (6th Cir. 1996).
See
Procedural
Law,
CORNELL
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/procedural_law (last visited Oct. 13, 2020) (“In particular,
laws that provide how the business of the court is to be conducted.”).
39 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976).
40 Id.
41 See In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Pat. Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“We reject Katz’s due process argument. Katz has not shown that the claim selection
procedure . . . was inadequate[.]”).
42 See id. at 1311–13 (describing the district court’s claim limitation and accompanying due
process analysis as “efficient and fair” because Katz did not show that non-selected claims
were not duplicative).
43 Id. at 1312.
44 See 16D C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1912 (2020) (synthesizing that the right of access to
the courts is protected by the constitutional due process clauses).
45 Id. (citing Coburn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 189 Ohio App. 3d. 322 (2010)).
37
38
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personal property.46 Moreover, “the [patent] right rests on the same foundation,
and is surrounded and protected by the same sanctions [as land property
rights].”47 Recently, the Supreme Court has announced that patents are “surely
included within the ‘property’ of which no person may be deprived by a State
without due process of law.”48
E. THE PATENT CLAUSE AND THE U.S. PATENT ACT

The next question is how patents got the same kind of irrational protections
as property rights. The property right protected by a patent is derived directly
from the Constitution. 49 Article I grants Congress the power “to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”50
Implementing its constitutional power, Congress enacted the U.S. Patent Act,
which allows a patent to be granted to “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” subject to
limitations in the act.51 The legal effect of a patent is a limited right of
exclusion.52 For 20 years, a patentee has the right to exclude all others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the patented invention. 53 The
exclusionary nature of patent rights is important for individuals like Katz because
patentees may exercise their constitutionally afforded patent rights only if they
prevent others from using those same rights.
Under the In re Katz safety valve, a patentee must be the one to make a
showing that her claims are non-duplicative, thus deserving of adjudication.54
The U.S. Patent Act states that a patent, and each distinct claim of a patent, is
presumed valid.55 The statute says “[e]ach claim of a patent . . . shall be presumed
valid independent of the validity of other claims.”56 Additionally, “dependent or
multiple claims shall be presumed valid even though dependent upon an invalid

46 Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876) (“A patent for an invention is as
much property as a patent for land.”); see Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999) (recognizing that patents “have long been considered
a species of property”).
47 Fruit-Jar, 94 U.S. at 96.
48 Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 642.
49 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8.
50 Id.
51 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
52 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1952).
53 § 154(a)–(b).
54 In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Pat. Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
55 35 U.S.C. § 282(a)(2012).
56 Id.
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claim.”57 The presumption of validity places the “burden of establishing
invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof . . . on the party asserting such
invalidity.”58
If a patent holder brings an infringement claim against another party, the
statute provides an invalidity defense against the infringement claim.59 As the
statute dictates, the burden of establishing invalidity rests on the alleged infringer
who is asserting invalidity as a defense.60 Congress did not expressly provide
what standard of proof attaches to the burden on the party alleging invalidity. 61
The Supreme Court filled in the gaps in Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. Partnership.62 In
that case, the Supreme Court held that by codifying the presumption of patent
validity, Congress implicitly attached a heightened standard of proof to a claim
for invalidity.63 The Court supported this finding by the long-time fixture of the
common law interpretation of the effect of a presumption. 64 In the context of
patent infringement cases, the word “presumption” in patent validity has always
had teeth, only to be overcome by “clear and cogent evidence.”65 The Court’s
interpretation of § 282 was based on “the assumption that the ordinary meaning
of [the] language” written by Congress in the statute “accurately expresses the
legislative purpose.”66 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation of § 282, finding that in order to have a successful invalidity
defense against a claim for infringement, a party must prove invalidity by clear
and convincing evidence.67 If the presumption of validity was not enough
protection, the U.S. Patent Act also includes a short and clear statement that a
patentee is entitled to civil redress if his or her patent is infringed.68

Id.
Id.
59 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2).
60 35 U.S.C § 282(a).
61 See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (2012) (stating only that the party asserting invalidity has the
burden of proof).
62 564 U.S. 91 (2011).
63 Id. at 113-14.
64 Id. at 101-02.
65 Id. at 101 (quoting Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Lab’ys, Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 2 (1934)).
66 Id. at 101 (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246,
252 (2004)).
67 Id. at 102 (citing Radio Corp., 293 U.S. at 8 (1934)).
68 See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1952) (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement
of his patent.”).
57
58
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F. MODERN PATENT LITIGATION

1. Patent Claims
Understanding claim limitation first requires an understanding of patent
claims. The description portion of a patent does just that — it describes the
invention and the “manner and process of making and using it.”69 The
description, together with the claims, make up the specification portion of a
patent application. 70 Claims make a patent valuable to its owner because they
define the scope of legal protection.71 The USPTO stresses the importance of
the claims, as they define the “protection afforded by the patent and which
questions of infringement are judged by the courts.”72 The Federal Circuit
affirmed this importance, announcing that “[i]t is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent
law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is
entitled the right to exclude.’”73 If claims are not properly drafted to cover every
detail of the description, then the patent owner has no legal claim over those
aspects of the description, and others would be free to appropriate the
technology as they wish.74 Thus, it is in the patent owner’s interest to draft the
claims as broadly as possible so that the owner secures legal protection over all
possible situations or future iterations of a patent.75 However, the examiners at
the USPTO are employed to determine whether the claims comply with the filing
requirements.76 Therefore, a patent examiner will only allow claims to the actual
invention as it is described.77
2. Explosion of Patent Litigation
The robust protections afforded by the U.S. Patent Act and the USPTO’s
role raises the question of why judges need special procedures like claim
69 General
Information
Concerning
Patents,
USPTO
(Oct.
2015),
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerningpatents#heading-17.
70 Id.
71 IP and Business: Quality Patents: Claiming What Counts, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (Feb.
2006), https://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/drafting_patent_claims_fulltext.html.
72 General Information Concerning Patents, supra note 69.
73 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting
Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys. Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir.
2004)).
74 See IP and Business: Quality Patents: Claiming What Counts, supra note 71 (explaining that
when claims are not properly drafted, then inventions disclosed but not claimed become prior
art).
75 See id. (“[B]road claims are attractive to the business applicant because they cover a
greater range of products or situations . . . .”).
76 See id. ([A] patent examiner in an IP office will not allow broad claims that cover more
than the inventor actually invented . . . .”).
77 Id.
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limitation in patent cases. The answer lies in the volume and complexity of
patent litigation today.78 Patent litigation has become one of the most complex,
lengthy, and costly types of litigation.79 These cases boast an average cost of
$500,000 per claim and last an average of 2.7 years.80 Importantly, judicial
intervention is the only way that patentees can assert and enforce their rights and
accused infringers can continue to operate.81 Adding to the complexity of these
cases are companies with large patent portfolios and even larger research and
development budgets.82 These companies, and their continued modification of
their patents, have increased the number of cumbersome cases that comprise the
current patent litigation landscape.83
Notably, there has been an explosion in patent litigation in recent years. 84
The number of patent suits filed in the year 2000 was around 2,500, with that
number doubling to around 5,000 by 2014.85 Less empirical is the anecdotal
evidence that patent cases are increasingly contentious because the global
economy is increasingly dependent on technological innovation. 86 Critics have
stated that the law has “tilted too far” in favor of protecting intellectual property
rights and resulting in stifled competition.87 The stakes are getting higher as the
Supreme Court litigates more patent issues.88 It is important to consider the
practice of judicial claim-limiting through the lens of complex modern patent
litigation where patentees may assert thousands of infringement claims under
multiple patents in one action.89

78 See Johnathon H. Ashter, Opening Pandora’s Box: Analyzing the Complexity of U.S. Patent
Litigation, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 217, 217 (2016) (“Patent litigation is widely regarded as one
of the most complex types of civil litigation, with costs often totaling millions of dollars and
typical cases lasting years.”).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 223, 227.
81 Id. at 222.
82 Rader, supra note 26.
83 Id.
84 Christopher Beauchamp, The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125 YALE L.J. 848, 850
(2016).
85 Id.
86 Jess Bravin, As Patents Grow More Contentious, Battleground Shifts to High Court, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 28, 2006), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116468538911734236.
87 Id.
88 See id. (describing the increasingly complex and valuable patent landscape leading to
litigation in the Supreme Court).
89 See David G. Chang, Claim Limitation: Confronting the Tension Between Limiting Claims in
Complex Patent Litigation and Preserving a Patentee’s Due Process Rights, 20 INTELL. PROP. & TECH.
L.J. 19, 21 (2008) (describing modern patent litigation where many infringement claims are
made under multiple patents).
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3. Judicial Solutions to the Patent Explosion
The paramount command of Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is to secure the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.”90 Accordingly, it has long been recognized that district courts
possess inherent powers that are “governed not by rule or statute but by the
control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve
the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”91 Given this inherent
discretionary power, it is understandable that judges would invoke it when
presiding over highly complex cases. Because of the modern rise in volume and
complexity of patent cases, judges have implemented various practices to make
cases more administratively feasible.92 Claim limiting is one of these practices.93
The litigation of multiple claims under multiple patents will be consolidated, and
the presiding judge will order the patentee to select a limited number of
representative claims to litigate.94 In re Katz was precisely this type of case.95
4. Claim Preclusion
An issue that may arise when narrowing claims in patent cases is the
possibility that the patentee will want to assert an infringement claim later on
using a claim that was deemed non-representative in prior litigation. 96 Whether
the patentee will be able to bring that claim may depend on the doctrine of res
judicata, otherwise known as claim preclusion.97 The latter applies “when there
is (i) ‘a judgment on the merits in a prior suit;’ (ii) ‘a second suit involving the
same parties or their privies;’ and (iii) the second suit is ‘based on the same cause
of action.’”98 The chief policy behind claim preclusion is to protect a defendant
from re-litigating the same claim; thus, any claim that was or could have been
raised previously must be dismissed as precluded.99 This doctrine poses a special

Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2016)(quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370
U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)).
92 See Chang, supra note 89, at 20 (explaining how courts have overcome “administrability
barriers of large complex patent cases[.]”).
93 See id. (describing claim-limiting as a method to improve administrability).
94 See id. (explaining that Federal Circuit guidance on making complex patent cases more
manageable has been involved consolidating patent claims).
95 In re Katz, 639 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
96 See, e.g., In re Katz, 639 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Katz arguing that his due process
rights were violated because he could no longer vindicate rights on non-selected claims).
97 Res
judicata,
CORNELL
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/res_judicata (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
98 Aviation Software, Inc. v. United States, 101 Fed. Cl. 656, 662-663 (2011) (quoting
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979)).
99 See Klaassen v. Atkinson, 348 F.Supp.3d 1106, 1158 (D. Kan. 2018) (“[T]he doctrine of
res judicata expresses a policy designed to protect the defendant from harassment and the
90
91
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threat to patentees whose claims have been narrowed since claim preclusion also
bars a suit arising from the same set of transactional facts.100 Moreover, there is
a possibility that a patentee will never get to assert those non-representative
claims to enforce their rights in court. This danger illustrates both the statutory
tension and the due process implications of judicial claim-limiting.
III. ANALYSIS
A. INSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY TENSIONS

In re Katz was appealed to the Federal Circuit, in part, because the district
court’s refusal to sever and stay Katz’s non-representative or possibly duplicative
claims allegedly violated Katz’s due process rights.101 Much of the commentary
and criticism of this case focuses on the tensions between a possible due process
violation and the act of judicial claim limiting.102 What is more troubling about
the In re Katz holding, and the practice of judicial claim-limiting, is the stark
tension with the U.S. Patent Act’s text and its purpose.
1. Institutional Power to Grant Patent Rights
The practice of judicial claim-limiting in patent cases is at odds with Title 35
of the United States Code because it undermines the clear congressional intent
to codify the process by which a patentee can secure patent rights for their works
and inventions. Title 35 outlines what a patentee must do to get patent rights
and the process of securing such rights for their works or inventions.103 Since
the framers thought patent rights were important, Congress used its
constitutional power to create the USPTO to systematically administer patent
rights.104
The U.S. Patent Act requires an applicant to submit a written application for
a patent to the USPTO consisting of a specification, drawings or specimens, and
an oath or declaration stating that the individual believes himself or herself to be
the original inventor.105 The specification requires a “written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in full, clear,
concise, and exact terms,” so “any person skilled in the art to which it pertains”

public from multiple litigation.”)(quoting Griffith v. Stout Remodel., Inc., 548 P.2d 1238, 1240
(Kan. 1976)).
100 Houston Prof’l Towing Ass’n v. City of Houston, 812 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 2016).
101 In re Katz, 639 F.3d at 1310.
102 See, e.g., Rader, supra note 26 (posing the question whether the In re Katz decision is at
odds with due process).
103 See generally, 35 U.S.C. § 1–390 (outlining requirements for grant of a patent).
104 35 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
105 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2012) 35 U.S.C. § 115(b) (2012).
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can make and use the invention.106 Most importantly, the specification includes
“one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject
matter which the inventor . . . regards as the invention.”107
Once the application is filed, it is examined by a patent examiner. 108 If it
appears to the examiner that the “applicant is entitled to a patent under the law,”
a patent is issued, and the applicant becomes a patent holder, or patentee.109 If
the application is not issued and the patent is rejected, the USPTO examiner will
notify the applicant and include reasons for rejections or requirements needed to
move forward with the prosecution of the patent applied for.110 The U.S. Patent
Act explicitly allows an applicant to appeal adverse USPTO decisions to the U.S.
Patent Trial and Appeal Board or the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.111
As a whole, this statutory scheme constitutes a large hurdle that patentees
must clear in order to secure patent rights. The burden on the patentee to secure
patent protection involves time and attention to detail in drafting their
applications.112 As a practical matter, successful patent prosecution generally
requires hefty legal fees because a patent agent or attorney is usually needed to
draft and argue the patent application before the USPTO.113
The challenges of the patent application process intentionally puts the
USPTO into the role of gatekeeper – allowing or disallowing the benefits of
patent rights to those applicants whose inventions meet the legal standards
established by Congress. A federal judge engaging in claim limitation undercuts
the USPTO’s prior decision that the patentee was entitled to legal rights
protecting their ability to make, use, and sell their inventions for a limited time.
By engaging in claim limitation and refusing to hear a claim that the USPTO has
already decided has legal force, a judge usurps the power granted to the USPTO
to issue patents. Federal courts have recognized that they have no authority to
adjudicate with respect to pending patents, recognizing that “Congress . . .
explicitly vested the [USPTO] with sole discretion over the ‘granting and issuing
of patents’”.114 Thus, the whole purpose of the provisions dictating the patent

35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).
108 See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2002) (“The Director shall cause an examination to be made of the
application and the alleged new invention . . . .”).
109 Id.
110 35 U.S.C. § 132 (2012).
111 35 U.S.C. § 134 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2012).
112 General
Information
Concerning
Patents,
USPTO
(Oct.
2015),
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerningpatents#heading-17.
113 Id.
114 Camsoft Data Sys., Inc. v. S. Elecs. Supply, Inc., 756 F.3d 327, 334 (5th Cir. 2014)
(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1122 (2015).
106
107
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application and issuance process is frustrated. If patent rights are already
established as valid by the examining body of the USPTO and a judge refuses to
recognize that decision, this practice renders the application process ineffectual.
In consequence, judicial claim-limiting conflicts with Congress’ intention that the
USPTO be powerful in administering patent rights to qualified applicants.
Judicial claim-limiting effectively disregards the U.S. Patent Act’s provisions
and, in turn, ignores the Constitution drafters’ intent to vest patentees with
powerful rights. The Constitution explicitly grants Congress the power to grant
essential, temporary monopolies to authors and inventors of their works and
inventions in order to promote the progress of “Science and useful Arts.”115 It
is clear that the intellectual property rights granted from the Patent Clause were
considered by the framers as imperative for the development and security of the
new country for which they were building a structure of governance. The
legislative history of the Constitution indicates unanimity in this sentiment. As
James Madison wrote in Federalist Paper No. 43, the “utility” of the power
entrusted to Congress to grant these rights “will scarcely be questioned.”116 The
U.S. Patent Act was promulgated as a response to this all-important
constitutional provision. 117 Based on drafter’s intent, to undermine the
provisions of the U.S. Patent Act is to ignore the looming history and purpose
that culminated in the enactment of federal patent laws that are rooted in the
constitution itself.
2. Tensions with Specific Provisions of the U.S. Patent Act
In addition to the tension with purpose of the Act, the narrowing patent
claims and the safety valve contradict specific provisions of the U.S. Patent Act.
The starkest tension between judicial claim limitation and the U.S. Patent Act is
the statutory presumption of validity of a patent and its claims. § 282 of the U.S.
Patent Act requires that:
[a] patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent
(whether in independent, dependent, or multiple dependent
form) shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of
other claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be
presumed valid even though dependent upon an invalid claim.118
In addition, the statute places the “burden of establishing invalidity of a patent
or any claim thereof” on the party asserting invalidity.119

115
116
117
118
119

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison).
35 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).
Id.
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a. Contradiction of Plain Language of the Statute
Judicial claim limitation is not consistent with the U.S. Patent Act because it
contradicts § 282’s plain command that a patent, and all its claims, shall be
presumed valid. The starting point for statutory interpretation is looking at the
plain language of the statute.120 The plain language is the most obvious guide in
determining the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. 121 At a cursory
glance, judicial claim limitation is a clear departure from the statute’s plain text
because a judge is barring claims from adjudication and placing the burden on
the patentee to establish validity. Under § 282, a patentee asserting an
infringement claim in federal court would have the advantageous starting point
of presumed validity of all claims under their patent, including those claims that
may be derivative of claims in the same patent which have been invalidated.122
The drafters used the word “independently” to describe the manner in which
each claim must be considered.123 In addition, the drafters exhaustively included
any form of a claim, whether they are in “independent, dependent, or multiple
dependent form.”124 The In re Katz court sanctioned the safety valve approach
that only allowed patentees to assert additional patent claims outside of the
allotted number if they were not duplicative of those claims asserted, or raised
additional issues of liability or damages.125 This test, in several ways, ignores the
statutory requirement that all patent claims are presumed valid. First, it does not
allow all claims, no matter what form they are in, to have statutorily-guaranteed
validity. Any presumption or protection contemplated by § 282 for a claim not
allowed to be brought before the court effectively disappears under the safety
valve standard. In addition, the safety valve test runs afoul the language of § 282
because it disallows a patentee from asserting dependent or multiple dependent
claims. Thus, a dependent or multiple dependent claims would likely be
considered “duplicative” by a federal judge determining the legal effect of a
patent claim through claim construction.
The test is especially troubling when considering the statute’s requirement
that even those claims dependent on invalidated claimed are presumed valid. If,
upon decision on the merits, a “representative claim” asserted by a patentee was
invalidated, any dependent claim that a district court refused to allow at the
outset of the case would never get the presumption of validity that § 282

120 Statutory
Construction,
CORNELL
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/statutory_construction (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
121 Id.
122 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Pat. Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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explicitly contemplates. 126 The presumption of validity for dependent claims is
a particularly strong starting point for a patentee in litigation. The legislature’s
special attention to claims potentially derivative of invalid claims, evidenced in
the statute’s language, reinforces that each claim is presumed valid and
protectable. Thus, no matter how many claims are asserted, a judge must apply
this presumption of validity to comply with the U.S. Patent Act.
To round out and sharpen the tension between claim limitation and the
language of the U.S. Patent Act, § 281 also provides that a patentee will have
enforcement rights for their patent by civil remedy.127 Specifically, guaranteed
access to the courts for enforcement is the only remedy named in the U.S. Patent
Act.128 In light of the foregoing statutory provisions, the enforcement provision
encompasses the core idea of the statute that every claim of a patent issued is
legally enforceable by the courts of the United States. By engaging in claim
limitation, and not allowing patentees to assert all of their claims, the courts are
ignoring this important provision that gives patent rights their teeth and value.
b. Contradiction of Courts’ Ongoing Interpretation of the Statute
Not only does the safety valve conflict with the U.S. Patent Act’s plain text,
but its essence runs contrary to the groundwork that courts, including the Federal
Circuit, have laid in interpreting the statute.
i. The Burden of Proof and Interpretation of ‘Presumption’
The language of § 282 requires that the burden of establishing patent
invalidity rests on the party asserting such invalidity.129 Practically, the party
asserting invalidity in litigation where a patentee’s claims are being limited is the
party accused of infringement, as the statute expressly provides an invalidity
defense to patent infringement.130 Put simply, the burden of proof is on the
defendant, not the patentee.131 Congress did not expressly provide what
standard of proof attaches to the defendant’s burden.132 Filling in the gaps, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s holding in Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd.
Partnership to establish that, in order to have a successful invalidity defense against
a claim for infringement, a party must prove invalidity by clear and convincing
evidence, a heightened standard of proof. 133 Just as § 282 was interpreted in the

35 U.S.C. § 282(a).
See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1952) (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement
of his patent.”).
128 Id.
129 35 U.S.C. § 282(b).
130 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2).
131 Id.
132 See id. (stating only that the party asserting invalidity has the burden of proof).
133 564 U.S. at 102 (citing Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng. Lab’ys, Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 8
(1934)).
126
127
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preceding subsection, the Court’s interpretation of § 282 was based on “the
assumption that the ordinary meaning of [the] language” written by Congress in
the statute “accurately expresses the legislative purpose.”134
Once again, the safety valve test completely undermines the statute by
effectively removing the burden of proof, which rests heavily on the defendant
according to the court’s own interpretation of the statute, and placing it on the
patentee.135 § 282 could not be clearer in its articulation of which party the
burden of proof rests upon.136 In interpreting § 282, the Federal Circuit and the
Supreme Court have doubled down on the language of the statute and made that
burden as heavy as possible in the civil litigation context, requiring a showing by
clear and convincing evidence.137 Yet, district judges are forcing patentees to
show that any additional claims, which have been patented, are non-duplicative
and valid, and thus, valid.138 This effectively places the burden on the patentee
to demonstrate the validity of her claims. This is a judicially created burdenshifting that is completely inconsistent with § 282.
Not only is this burden-shifting not supported by the statute, but it does not
follow the logic of the Federal Circuit’s own interpretation of the same. As
outlined above, the Federal Circuit took a belt-and-suspenders approach in
articulating the standard of proof that a defendant would have to meet in
asserting invalidity of a patentee’s claims in defending an alleged infringement.139
The defendant’s heavy burden of proof does not comport with the burden placed
on the patentee to show that any “unselected claims presented unique issues as
to liability or damages.”140
ii. Claim Construction
Other doctrines reflecting an expansive interpretation of the U.S. Patent Act,
insofar as how broad the patentee’s rights are in legal force, illustrate the
inconsistency of judicial claim-limiting and the ongoing judicial interpretation of
the U.S. Patent Act.141 Patent claim construction is the process of determining

134 Id. at 101 (quoting Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246,
252 (2004)).
135 Microsoft, 564 U.S. at 102.
136 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of
his patent.”).
137 Microsoft, 564 U.S. at 102.
138 See, e.g., In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Pat. Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir.
2011)(requiring Katz to show that any patent claims added to the suit were non-duplicative of
the representative claims).
139 Microsoft, 564 U.S. at 102.
140 In re Katz, 639 F.3d at 1312.
141 See, e.g., Glen P. Belvis, The Doctrine of Equivalents and § 112 Equivalents, BRINKS GILSON
& LIONE, https://www.brinksgilson.com/files/100.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2020) (“The
doctrine of equivalents is a judicially created doctrine that is expansive in nature.”).
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the boundaries of the legal protection provided by the patent.142 When a
patentee is seeking to enforce their rights under a patent, federal judges are tasked
with claim construction.143 If claims are the most valuable aspect of a patent for
its owner, then claim construction is the most important step in the litigation
process because a judge will use her own interpretation of the claims to decide
issues of infringement and invalidity.144 The Federal Circuit outlined the
standards of claim construction in Phillips v. AWH Corp.145 A court will first look
to the plain language of the claims in the patent, potentially with the aid of a
general-purpose dictionary.146 If that is not informative, as the Federal Circuit
noted that it often is not because of the complex nature of patent law, the court
must examine the “meaning of a claim term as understood by persons of skill in
the [relevant] art.”147 The Federal Circuit also emphasizes the instructive nature
of the immediate context in which a claim term appears, as well as “other claims
of the patent in question”.148 Finally, the Federal Circuit requires that claims and
the terms therein “do not stand alone,” and must be read as a part of “a fully
integrated written instrument.”149 Thus, extrinsic sources can be taken into
account, such as the prosecution history.150
It seems incongruous to standardize the process of judicial interpretation of
patent claims in this manner and simultaneously refuse to consider additional
claims that make up the “fully integrated written instrument.”151 If a judge is to
consider the patent as a whole, which includes other contextual claims as well as
the prosecution history to determine issues of infringement, then the narrowing
of claims completely frustrates this process and should be considered at the very
least a hinderance, and at most, a detriment to finding whether a patent has in
fact been infringed. Most importantly, the narrowing of claims and the
consequential narrowing of patent rights contradicts the expansive interpretation
that the courts have taken thus far in claim construction.
iii. Doctrine of Equivalents
The narrowing of rights by judicial claim limiting is additionally inconsistent
with the doctrine of equivalents, because the doctrine is a broad interpretation
142 J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and
Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U.L. REV. 1, 3 (2013).
143 Id. at 4.
144 See id. (“[W]hen patentees seek to enforce their patents, the task of claim construction
falls to generalist federal district court judges . . . .”).
145 415 F.3d 1303, 1313-15 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
146 Id. at 1314.
147 Id. at 1313.
148 Id. at 1314.
149 Id. at 1315 (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc)).
150 Id. at 1314-15.
151 Id. at 1315 (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 978).
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of the U.S. Patent Act that expands a patentee’s rights. Even though a patentee’s
legal rights are based on the text of the claims, courts may extend the protection
of the patent beyond the literal wording of the claims under the doctrine of
equivalents.152 Under the doctrine, even “if an asserted claim does not literally
read on an accused product, infringement may still occur . . . if there is not a
substantial difference between the limitations of the claim and the accused
product.”153 The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent competitors of the
patentee who are trying to avoid merely literal infringement from attempting to
introduce insignificant modifications into the claimed invention. 154 In the
context of In re Katz, differences in the patentee’s claims considered nonrepresentative, and not considered in the judgment for infringement, could have
been considered equivalent to the infringer’s claims. The doctrine ultimately
takes an expansive view of how far a patentee’s rights extend and the court’s role
in enforcing them. The narrowing of claims is not only inconsistent with how
extensively the courts have interpreted a patentee’s rights, but also may render
the doctrine of equivalents ineffectual, as not all claims would be considered in
litigation.
B. DOES THE SAFETY VALVE STANDARD VIOLATE DUE PROCESS?

Although I submit that the safety valve’s largest problem is its inconsistency
with statutory provisions, it is important to note that the grounds on which In re
Katz was appealed was the alleged violation of Katz’s constitutional due process
rights.155 Commentary on this case has been couched in terms of due process,
and district courts have engaged in judicial claim-limiting citing In re Katz as
precedent to ensure that they do not trample on the due process rights of
patentees.156 The question then becomes whether the allowance of an
opportunity to introduce “unselected claims present[ing] unique issues as to
liability or damages,”157 or good cause, is enough to comport with due process.

Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., Inc., 339 U.S. 605, 608–09 (1950).
Doctrine
of
Equivalents,
CORNELL
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/doctrine_of_equivalents (last visited Oct. 30, 2020) (“The
purpose of the doctrine is to prevent an infringer from stealing the benefit of a patented
invention by changing only minor or insubstantial details of the claimed invention[.]”); Bayer
AG v. Elan Pharm. Rsch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
154 Bayer AG, 212 F.3d at 1250.
155 In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Pat. Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
156 See Masimo Corp. v. Phillips Elec. N. Am. Corp., 918 F. Supp. 2d 277, 283 (D. Del.
2013) (citing In re Katz); see also Stamps.com Inc. v. Endicia, Inc., 437 Fed. App’x 897, 902
(Fed. Cir. 2011)(citing In re Katz).
157 In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Pat. Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
152
153
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Doctrinal interpretation of the Fifth Amendment yielded procedural due
process in Mathews v. Eldridge.158 In Mathews, the Supreme Court held that
individuals had a statutorily created property right in social security benefits, and
the termination of such benefits had due process implications.159 In comparison,
a patentee has statutorily created property rights in patent claims,160 and therefore
the refusal to hear those claims may similarly have due process implications. The
safety valve articulated in In re Katz was likely the Federal Circuit’s nod to the
threshold requirement that some process is due. However, the Federal Circuit,
sitting as an appellate court, failed to engage in a full due process analysis, holding
only that Katz failed to “demonstrate that the district court’s claim selection
procedure risked erroneously depriving it of its rights and that the risk
outweighed the added costs associated with a substitute procedure.”161 Thus,
the court reasoned, Katz failed to make a due process claim.162 The court opined
that Katz was in a better position to show that the claims were non-duplicative,
thus the burden shifting was reasonable.163 Additionally, the court rested its
holding on the fact that Katz made an unsubstantiated claim that 64 claims were
too few, and he never attempted to show why additional claims needed to be
adjudicated.164 As the Federal Circuit found, it seems that the safety valve
comports with due process because Katz could have brought forth claims to be
reviewed upon the proper showing of need, thus mitigating any risk of erroneous
deprivation of its property rights.165 It is logical for the court to shake its finger
at the patentee because it looks like the patentee is asking the court for redress
for a wrong it brought on herself by not coming up with good cause for her
additional claims. However, the safety valve still does not entirely mitigate the
due process problem. The real due process problem arises from the effects of
claim limiting on further litigation under principles of res judicata.
In 2016, when a patentee voluntarily removed claims from a previous suit
against a defendant, the Federal Circuit held that a patentee’s due process rights
were not violated when the same claims were barred from being brought in a

424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id. at 332-33.
160 Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876) (“A patent for an invention is as
much property as a patent for land.”); see Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999) (recognizing that patents “have long been considered
a species of property”).
161 In re Katz, 639 F.3d at 1311 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 391, 332 (1976)).
162 Id.
163 Id. at 1311.
164 Id. at 1311-12.
165 See In re Katz, 639 F.3d at 1312 (“Because Katz did not file a motion to add claims with
the requisite showing of need, the court concluded that Katz ‘cannot legitimately complain
that it did not have a meaningful opportunity to be heard on those claims.’”).
158
159
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subsequent suit against the same defendant.166 The court reasoned that the
patentee was precluded from “trying to get a second bite at the apple,”167 and
that boilerplate reservation of rights to assert the non-selected claims at a later
time were negated by the patentee’s own active participation in narrowing the
claims.168 Although Katz objected to the narrowing of claims, it is likely that the
narrowing of the claims would prevent any of the non-representative claims from
being asserted against the same defendant.169 Thus, the due process analysis
should be informed by the effects of the safety valve on the patentee’s rights to
assert any claims in the future that were narrowed at the outset of a previous
lawsuit.
The Federal Circuit did not perform a full due process analysis in its In re Katz
opinion,170 thus a full analysis is performed below to inform the due process
implications of patent claim limitations and safety valve test.
The first factor to evaluate is the private interest affected.171 Weighing heavily
in favor of the inadequacy of the Court’s safety valve test is the private interest
affected because a patent right and each claim under that patent is not only
presumed valid by federal statute, but is traditionally recognized at common law
as a property right protectable by the same sanctions as real or personal property
rights.172 Companies in the United States globally spend trillions of dollars on
research and development to build their patent portfolios, and patents serve as
financial corporate assets in the modern market.173 In large or medium-sized
companies, a strong patent portfolio provides confidence and security in day-today business.174 For smaller companies, or start-ups, the entire valuation of the
company is usually dependent on the company’s patent portfolio.175
Technological innovation permeates modern society and businesses are

166 Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v. ABBYY USA Software House, Inc., 813 F.3d 1368, 1376
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
167 Id. at 1374.
168 Id. at 1376.
169 See id. at 1376 (holding that voluntarily narrowing claims prevents non-representative
claims from being asserted against the same defendant).
170 See In re Katz, 639 F.3d at 1312–13 (The court merely approved the district court’s due
process analysis, and did not engaged in a due process analysis as laid out as articulated in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
171 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35 (1976).
172 Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876) (“A patent for an invention is as
much property as a patent for land.”); see Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999) (recognizing that patents “have long been considered
a species of property”).
173 Dr. Masoud Vakili, Patent Portfolio Valuations – Importance of IP and Patents, IP WATCH DOG
(July
12,
2017),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/07/12/patent-portfoliovaluations/id=85409/.
174 Id.
175 Id.
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responding by moving from tangible assets to intangible assets that are protected
by patents.176 With this type of capital movement in the business world, it is
clear that economic survival is dependent on the ability to protect and enforce
the rights guaranteed by a patent.
Also lending heavily to the unconstitutional nature of the safety valve test is
the high risk that a patentee will be erroneously deprived of a patent right because
of the arbitrary limits on “representative” claims and the danger of claim
preclusion in later litigation. The court’s mandate that only representative claims
may be brought is only effective for judging infringement in the context of a
specific case with specific facts. For example, the arbitrary number of 64 claims
in In re Katz may have been sufficient to adjudge whether or not the defendants
infringed Katz’s patents in that specific litigation. This explains Katz’s inability
to come forward with good cause to bring additional claims that would raise
unique issues. However, any litigation in the future involving non-representative
claims that were forced out of a former case because of common “genealogy”177
would be barred from ever being brought as precluded under principles of res
judicata.178 This fact is aggravated by the reality of modern patent litigation
where infringement claims arise against multiple defendants. 179 For example, if
Katz attempted to bring non-representative claims that were excluded in the
2011 case against any one of the multiple defendants, the Federal Circuit would
have strong precedent to refuse to hear the case because the safety valve’s
falsehood of protection states that Katz had a chance to make a meaningful
showing of need to bring the claim in prior litigation.
The probability that more process would mitigate the risk of erroneous
deprivation of a patentee’s rights is great because the ability to sever and stay
non-representative claims would allow a patentee to enforce all of their patents
and claims. Under the U.S. Patent Act, judicial intervention is the only mode of
enforcing a patentee’s rights.180 Given that claim preclusion for claims that have
never been litigated is the grounds for a due process argument, the court could
employ some equitable measures that would preserve a patentee’s right to have
their day in court for all of their claims. For example, the court could do what
Katz asked of it: sever and stay all non-representative claims.181 This would allow
a patentee the ability to bring an infringement claim based on a patent claim that
Id.
In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Pat. Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
178 Res
judicata,
CORNELL
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/res_judicata (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
179 See Chang, supra note 89 (describing modern patent litigation where many infringement
claims are made under multiple patents against multiple defendants).
180 See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of
his patent.”).
181 See In re Katz, 639 F.3d at 1310 (“Katz appealse the district court’s decision not to sever
and stay the unselected claims.”).
176
177
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was excluded without the threat of a dismissal based on claim preclusion. It
would be ignorant not to acknowledge the possibility for abusive litigation tactics
where a patentee would attempt to re-litigate against the same defendants using
non-representative claims. Therefore, the sever and stay solution could be
accompanied by a requisite burden of production for the patentee to show some
set of facts as to why the infringement claim is warranted. This type of measure
may impose some administrative costs on the judiciary, but not so much that it
would outweigh the benefit of preserving a patentee’s rights. A judge’s discretion
to manage his case docket in the way that he sees fit is not a justification that is
sufficient to overcome a violation of due process. Practical administration of the
law should not be viewed as a superior interest to constitutional due process.
The safety valve standard employed by the Federal Circuit does not comport
with constitutional due process because it practically destroys the property
interest of a patentee by barring infringement claims that are statutorily presumed
as valid. On balance of the Mathews factors, judicial claim-limiting and the safety
valve test is at odds with procedural process due because there is an erroneous
deprivation of a patentee’s property interest without sufficient justification.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there are serious tensions between judicial claim limiting in
patent litigation and the U.S. Patent Act that have blurred the clear congressional
intent to afford certain rights to patentees through a process outside of the
courts. The rise of complex patent litigation has resulted in the Federal Circuit
articulating a standard for dealing with claim limitation that violates
constitutional due process. The In re Katz safety valve may appear to satisfy due
process on its face. However, it fails to do so in light of the ramifications of
claim limiting when non-representative claims are barred from later litigation
under principles of res judicata.
The Federal Circuit may weigh in on the issue again in Finjan, Inc. v. Juniper
Networks.182 This case addresses the constitutionality of methods of claim
limiting that do not necessarily include a safety valve.183 By necessity, the Federal
Circuit may be forced to re-evaluate, or re-explain its holding in In re Katz.
The court should find that the biggest problem with judicial claim-limiting
under the In re Katz safety valve standard is the stark contrast between the text
and the provisions of the U.S. Patent Act. This contrast invites congressional
action to amend the statute or enact another congressional directive that would
ease the current tension. It is not the place of the courts to undermine
congressional intent. If Congress was to speak on the issue, the ripest tension to
182
183
183

No. 3:17-cv-05659-WHA, 2020 WL 5988532 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2019).
Id.
Id.
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relieve is the opposition of the presumption of validity in § 282 of the U.S. Patent
Act, which is undermined by the court’s requirement that the patentee make a
good cause showing of need to include non-representative claims. To reach the
problematic foundation of a patentee’s arguments about constitutional due
process violations, Congress would also have to issue some directive on whether,
in the context of high technology and modern patent portfolios, patents should
still get protection akin to real or personal property under the Constitution.
Until such congressional statement is issued, district judges can manage their
dockets efficiently while also preserving patentees’ due process rights by
instituting equitable judicial solutions, such as a sever and stay for those claims
that were not considered representative. Additionally, patentees should be
careful to preserve their rights by objecting to mandates from the trial court
attempting to narrow their claims. Any objections of this nature should be
supported by specific issues of need or damage, although it is unclear what
exactly this showing would require given that no patentee has defeated a
narrowing order for good cause. Clarity on this issue is important because
patentees need to know how to protect their rights conferred on them through
the granting of their patent claims.
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